The ruling summarized the background of the case:

A Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition was filed on behalf of three minor children after the eldest of them reported physical and emotional mistreatment by the children’s father. The Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services investigated the situation and discovered, among other things, that all eight of the children in thefamily had been home schooled by the mother rather than educated in a public or private school.The attorney representing the younger two children asked the juvenile court to order that the children be enrolled in a public or private school. The dependency court declined to make such an order despite the court’s opinion that the home schooling the children were receiving was “lousy,” “meager,” and “bad,” and despite the court’s opinion that keeping the children at home deprived them of situations where (1) they could interact with people outside the family, (2) there are people who could provide help if something is amiss in the children’s lives, and (3) they could develop emotionally in a broader world than the parents’ “cloistered” setting.

As noted above, the court ruled that the parents have a constitutional right to home school the children. From that ruling the attorney for the younger children seeks extraordinary writ relief.

While I agree that parents have the right to home school their children, I don’t believe that they have the right to deny their children the right to an education by qualified and credentialed educators. Those who want to educate their children at home should either be qualified and credentialed educators themselves or hire such people to teach their children. Similarly, parents of sick children have the right to care for their children at home. However, when a child needs medical care, they should summon a qualified and credentialed medical professional and not attempt to provide such care themselves unless they have the professional training and credentials to do so. I don’t think anyone would seriously argue that parents with no medical training or credentials have the right to perform appendectomies or other surgery on their children yet when it comes to education, many people in our society seem to have little concern for the significant and long-term harm to children that can result when they are denied the right to a quality education that meets basic standards.

Fortunately, in this case, the Second District Court of Appeal agreed that children’s rights and California law cannot be infringed by parents who claim that that the right to home school their children exempts them from compliance with the law and gives them the right to deprive their children of a legal education.

This ruling will undoubtedly be appealed to the California Supreme Court. I certainly hope it is upheld and will be following it closely.

Text of the ruling:

Filed 2/28/08
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re RACHEL L. et al., Persons Coming
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
B192878
JONATHAN L. and MARY GRACE L.,
Petitioners,
v.
SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF
LOS ANGELES,
Respondent;
___________________________________
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND
FAMILY SERVICES,
Real Party in Interest.
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. JD00773)
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS in mandate. Stephen Marpet, Temporary Judge.
(Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Writ granted.
Children’s Law Center of Los Angeles, Cameryn Schmidt and
Christine Caldwell, for Petitioners.
No appearance for Respondent.
2
Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, Larry Cory, Assistant County Counsel
and Judith A. Luby, for Real Party in Interest.
___________________________________________
3

In this dependency case (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300), we consider the question whether parents can legally “home school” their children. The
attorney for two of the three minor children in the case has petitioned this court for extraordinary writ relief, asking us to direct the juvenile
court to order that the children be enrolled in a public or private school, and actually attend such a school.

The trial court’s reason for declining to order public or private schooling for the children was its belief that parents have a constitutional right
to school their children in their own home. However, California courts have held that under provisions in the Education Code, parents do not have a
constitutional right to home school their children. Thus, while the petition for extraordinary writ asserts that the trial court’s refusal to order
attendance in a public or private school was an abuse of discretion, we find the refusal was actually an error of law. It is clear to us that
enrollment and attendance in a public full-time day school is required by California law for minor children unless (1) the child is enrolled in a
private full-time day school and actually attends that private school, (2) the child is tutored by a person holding a valid state teaching credential
for the grade being taught, or (3) one of the other few statutory exemptions to compulsory public school attendance (Ed. Code, § 48220 et seq.)
applies to the child. Because the parents in this case have not demonstrated that any of these exemptions apply to their children, we will grant the
petition for extraordinary writ.

BACKGROUND OF THE CASE

A Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 petition was filed on behalf of three minor children after the eldest of them reported physical and
emotional mistreatment by

4

the children’s father. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services investigated the situation and discovered, among other
things, that all eight of the children in the family had been home schooled by the mother rather than educated in a public or private school.1 The
attorney representing the younger two children asked the juvenile court to order that the children be enrolled in a public or private school. The
dependency court declined to make such an order despite the court’s opinion that the home schooling the children were receiving was “lousy,”
“meager,” and “bad,” and despite the court’s opinion that keeping the children at home deprived them of situations where (1) they could interact with
people outside the family, (2) there are people who could provide help if something is amiss in the children’s lives, and (3) they could develop
emotionally in a broader world than the parents’ “cloistered” setting. As noted above, the court ruled that the parents have a constitutional right
to home school the children. From that ruling the attorney for the younger children seeks extraordinary writ relief.

DISCUSSION

1. California’s Provisions for Compulsory Education of Minor Children Article IX, section 1 of California’s Constitution states: “A general diffusion
of knowledge and intelligence being essential to the preservation of the rights and liberties 1 Over the years, the parents of the children have
given various reasons for not sending the children to school. Although previously they stated they do not believe in the policies of the public
school system, more recently they have asserted that they home school because of their religious beliefs. The father also recently opined that
educating children outside the home exposes them to “snitches.”

5

of the people, the Legislature shall encourage by all suitable means the promotion of intellectual, scientific, moral, and agricultural improvement.”
“In obedience to the constitutional mandate to bring about a general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence, the Legislature, over the years,
enacted a series of laws. A primary purpose of the educational system is to train school children in good citizenship, patriotism and loyalty to the
state and the nation as a means of protecting the public welfare. [Citation.] The Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 [45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070, 39 A.L.R. 468], held that: ‘No question is raised concerning the power of the state
reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require that all children of proper age
attend some school, that teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic disposition, that certain studies plainly essential to good
citizenship must be taught, and that nothing be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare.’ [¶] Included in the laws governing the
educational program were those regulating the attendance of children at school and the power of the state to enforce compulsory education of children
within the state at some school is beyond question. (Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 [43 S.Ct. 625, 628, 67 L.Ed. 1042, 29 A.L.R. 1446]; Ex parte
Liddell, 93 Cal. 633, 640 [29 P. 251].” (In re Shinn (1961) 195 Cal.App.2d 683, 686-687.)

Full-time public school education for persons between the ages of six and eighteen is compulsory under California’s compulsory education law (Ed.
Code,

6

§ 48200 et seq.),2 “and each parent, guardian, or other person having control or charge of the pupil shall send the pupil to the public full-time day
school . . . and for the full time designated as the length of the schoolday by the governing board of the school district” (§ 48200). Exemptions to
compulsory public school education are made for, among others, children who (1) attend a private full-time day school (§ 48222) or (2) are instructed
by a tutor who holds a valid state teaching credential for the grade being taught (§ 48224). These provisions of the Education Code (in their
predecessor section numbers) were held to be constitutional in People v. Turner (1953) 121 Cal.App.2d Supp. 861, 865 et seq., (“Turner”), and an
appeal to the United States Supreme Court from that decision was dismissed for want of a substantial federal question in Turner v. People of the
State of California (1954) 347 U.S. 972 [98 L.Ed. 1112, 74 S.Ct. 785]. Turner was cited with approval in In re Shinn, supra, 195 Cal.App.2d at p. 694
(“Shinn”).

In Shinn, children were found to be habitually truant and were made wards of the juvenile court because their parents violated the compulsory
education laws in effect at that time. The laws were former sections 12101, 12154, and 12155, which were predecessors to current sections 48200,
48222, and 48224, respectively. (Shinn, supra, 195 Cal.App.2d at pp. 687, 693-694.)

In Turner, the court affirmed a judgment of conviction of parents who refused to send their children to public school and instead provided them with
instruction that did

2 Unless otherwise indicated, all references herein to statutes are to the Education Code.

7

not come within the exemptions to the compulsory public school education law. The appellant parents were convicted of violating former section 16601,
a predecessor to current section 48200. Former sections 16624, and 16625 provided exemptions for children attending private full-time day school and
children being educated by a person holding a valid teaching credential, but the parents did not make use of the exemptions. (Turner, supra, 121
Cal.App.2d Supp. at pp. 863-864.)

The parents in Turner contended that former section 16601 was unconstitutional because it deprived them of a right to determine how and where their
children should be educated. Citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925) 268 U.S. 510 [69 L.Ed. 1070, 45 S.Ct. 571], the Turner court stated the
statute would be unconstitutional if it required parents to place their children in public schools and had no alternative means of education, but the
court noted that former section 16601 permitted such alternative means and therefore was not unconstitutional. The court specifically rejected the
argument that it is unconstitutional to require that parents possess the qualifications prescribed by statute if the parents seek to act as their
children’s teachers, saying that nothing in the Pierce opinion declared or intimated such a finding of unconstitutionality. (Turner, supra, 121
Cal.App.2d Supp. at p. 865.)

The Turner court observed that there are “many cases dealing with statutes of this character,” and specifically referred to State v. Hoyt (1929) 84
N.H. 38 [146 A. 170], where the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held constitutional a statute requiring children to be educated in either a public
school or an approved private school, and rejected the argument that the federal guarantee of liberty permits parents to

8

resist such state statutes by having their children educated in their own home by the parents themselves or a private tutor. (State v. Hoyt, supra,
146 A. at p. 171; Turner, supra, 121 Cal.App.2d Supp. at pp. 865-867.) The Turner court observed that the court in Hoyt stated it would be an
unreasonable burden on the state to have to supervise each and every home in which a child was being educated. (Turner, at pp. 866-867.) The Turner
court further observed it could find no cases in which a court has held that a state’s failure to permit home instruction as an alternative to public
school education is unconstitutional. (Id. at p. 867.)

Turner also held that the subject former statutes were neither arbitrary nor unreasonable when they required that teachers in private full-time day
schools only be “persons capable of teaching” and did not have to hold a valid teaching credential for the grade being taught, but did require that a
home tutor hold such a credential. The court observed that whereas it is unreasonably difficult and expensive for a state to supervise parents who
instruct children in their homes, supervising teachers in organized private schools is less difficult and expensive. (Turner, supra, 121 Cal.App.2d
Supp. at p. 867.) Moreover, it would not be unreasonable for the Legislature to conclude that teachers in private schools would be directly
supervised by the persons who run the schools, and such persons would have an interest in maintaining the required standard of instruction by
competent teachers so that the schools would continue to qualify for the private full-time day school exemption. (Id. at pp. 867-868.)

9

Additionally, the Turner court rejected, and noted that courts in other states had also rejected, the notion that parents instructing their children
at home come within the private full-time day school exemption in then-section 16624 (now section 48222). The court stated that a simple reading of
the statutes governing private schools and home instruction by private tutors shows the Legislature intended to distinguish the two, for if a private
school includes a parent or private tutor instructing a child at home, there would be no purpose in writing separate legislation for private
instruction at home. (Turner, supra, 121 Cal.App.2d Supp. at p. 868; accord Shinn, supra, 195 Cal.App.2d at p. 693.) Moreover, even if being taught
at a parent’s home could be construed as attendance at a private day school, the parents in Turner had not demonstrated that their home already
qualified as a private school under the requirements of the Education Code. (Turner, at p. 869.)

Nor was the Turner court persuaded by the parents’ contention that the education being provided to their children in their home was as good or better
than the children would have obtained in a public or private school or through a credentialed tutor, and therefore the purpose of the statutes was
satisfied. The court stated California’s legislative scheme makes no such exemption to attendance in a public school. (Turner, supra, 121 Cal.App.2d
Supp. at p. 868-869; accord Shinn, supra, 195 Cal.App.2d, at p. 694, where the court stated that “[h]ome education, regardless of its worth, is not
the legal equivalent of attendance in school in the absence of instruction by qualified private tutors.”)

10

Turner was cited with approval in Board of Education v. Allen (1968) 392 U.S. 236 [20 L.Ed.2d 1060, 88 S.Ct. 1923] (“Allen”). There, the Supreme
Court stated: “Since Pierce [v. Society of Sisters was decided], a substantial body of case law has confirmed the power of the States to insist that
attendance at private schools, if it is to satisfy state compulsory-attendance laws, be at institutions which provide minimum hours of instruction,
employ teachers of specified training, and cover prescribed subjects of instruction. Indeed, the State’s interest in assuring that these standards
are being met has been considered a sufficient reason for refusing to accept instruction at home as compliance with compulsory education statutes.
These cases were a sensible corollary of Pierce v. Society of Sisters: if the State must satisfy its interest in secular education through the
instrument of private schools, it has a proper interest in the manner in which those schools perform their secular educational function.” (Id., 392
U.S. at pp. 245-247, fns. omitted.) The Allen court cited Turner as a case in which home instruction was rejected as a means of complying with a
state’s compulsory education laws. (Id. at p. 247, fn. 8.) Moreover, as noted above, the appeal to the United States Supreme Court by the parents in
Turner was dismissed for want of a substantial federal question.3

3 In the instant case, the parents’ citation to Cassady v. Signorelli (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 55 provides them with no support for their assertion of a
right to home school their children with the mother providing the educational instruction. Cassady is a family law case involving the question
whether the trial court abused its discretion when it ordered that a minor child must attend a public or private school rather than be home schooled.
Although the reviewing court stated that “a parent might normally have the right to provide home schooling, private schooling, or government
schooling to

11

The Legislature has not amended the substantive aspects of the compulsory education statutes that were analyzed in Turner and Shinn. Like those
courts, we find no reason to strike down the Legislature’s evaluation of what constitutes an adequate education scheme sufficient to promote the
“general diffusion of knowledge and intelligence,” which Article IX, section 1 of our Constitution states is “essential to the preservation of the
rights and liberties of the people.” We agree with the Shinn court’s statement that “the educational program of the State of California was designed
to promote the general welfare of all the people and was not designed to accommodate the personal ideas of any individual in the field of education.”
(Shinn, supra, 195 Cal.App.2d at p. 697.)

2. Consequences of Parental Denial of a Legal Education Because parents have a legal duty to see to their children’s schooling within the provisions
of these laws, parents who fail to do so may be subject to a criminal complaint against them, found guilty of an infraction, and subject to
imposition of fines or an order to complete a parent education and counseling program. (§§ 48291 & 48293.) Additionally, the parents are subject
to being ordered to enroll their children in an appropriate school or education program and provide proof of enrollment to the court, and willful
failure to comply with such an order may be punished by a fine for civil contempt. (§ 48293.)

a child,” the court did not address the requirements of the Education Code, nor the excellent treatment of California’s public compulsory education
law found in Shinn and Turner. The court simply ruled that based on the facts of the case, it was not an abuse its discretion to order that the child
not be home schooled.

12

Jurisdiction over such parental infractions may be assigned to juvenile court judges. (§ 48295; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 601.4.) Further, under
section 361, subdivision (a) of the Welfare and Institutions Code, the juvenile court has authority to limit a parent’s control over a dependent
child, including a parent’s right to make educational decisions for a child, so long as the limitations do not exceed what is necessary to protect
the child; and under section 362, subdivision (d) of that code, the juvenile court may make reasonable orders directed at the parents to ensure that
the child regularly attends school. An order directing a child’s regular attendance at school in compliance with the Education Code’s provisions for
compulsory education is a protection against the child being adjudged a habitual truant, while it also recognizes the child’s rights under
California’s compulsory public education law.

3. Analysis of the Education Issues in the Instant Case

The parents in this case assert that when the mother gives the children educational instruction at home, the parents are acting within the law
because mother operates through Sunland Christian School where the children are “enrolled.”4 However, the parents have not demonstrated that mother
has a teaching credential such that the children can be said to be receiving an education from a credentialed tutor. It is clear that the education
of the children at their home, whatever the quality of that 4 In support of the parents’ home schooling, Terry Neven, Sunland Christian School’s
administrator, submitted a letter in which he stated the school is a private school and the two younger children are enrolled there. The letter fails
to mention that the children do not actually receive education instruction at the school.

13

education, does not qualify for the private full-time day school or credentialed tutor exemptions from compulsory education in a public full-time day
school. The parents are not aided by a letter from the Lynwood Unified School District stating that Sunland Christian School “appeared to be a valid
charter school.” Aside from the fact that Sunland Christian School cannot be a charter school unless it is, among other things, part of California’s
public school system and nonsectarian,5 the parents present no authority to the effect that a charter school can excuse the statutory requirement
that tutors be credentialed if their students are to come within the tutor exemption to compulsory public school education.

Likewise, an affidavit of Sunland Christian School administrator Terry Neven provides no authority for the parents’ home schooling. In the affidavit,
Neven talks at length about “independent study” programs, including his school’s independent study program. He does not mention any Education Code
section that provides for parents teaching their children by “independent study” through private schools. Section 51745 et seq. provides for
independent study for students, through a school district or a county office of education; however, its purpose is to provide students with certain
educational opportunities, such as education during travel, or individualized 5 Charter schools are part of, and are under the jurisdiction of,
California’s public school system. (§ 47615; Wilson v. State Bd. of Education (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1125, 1137 et seq.) They must be nonsectarian in
their programs and all other operations, they cannot charge tuition, and they cannot be conversions from private schools. (§§ 47605, subd. (d)(1)
& 47602, subd. (b); Wilson, at p. 1131.) Their teachers must be credentialed as teachers in other public schools would be required to be
credentialed. (§ 47605, subd. (l); Wilson, at p. 1137.)

14

study in an area of interest or subject not currently available in the regular school curriculum. Clearly, section 51745 does not apply to mother’s
home schooling of the children.

Nor is there importance to Mr. Neven’s statement, in a letter to the Lynwood Unified School District, that Sunland Christian School “has been
evaluated by both Los Angeles Unified School District and the Los Angeles County Office of Education to be in compliance with state laws.”6 Such
representation does not constitute a statement that the Los Angeles Unified School District and the Los Angeles County Office of Education knowingly
gave their stamp of approval to children being deprived of an education in a public or private full-time day school setting, or by a credentialed
tutor, through the ruse of enrolling them in a private school and then letting them stay home and be taught by a non-credentialed parent.

Although Mr. Neven reported to the Lynwood Unified School District that he makes visits to the parents’ home about four times a year, and although
some of the children in the family reported to the Department of Children and Family Services social worker that they were given tests at the end of
some school years and they took the tests at the Sunland Christian School, the fact remains that the children are taught at home by a
non-credentialed person. Moreover, the very language of section 48222 is an implicit rejection of the parents’ position that having someone from
Sunland Christian 6 Both the Lynwood and the Los Angeles school districts are mentioned in Mr. Neven’s letter because the children live in one school
district, and the Sunland Christian School is in the other school district. 15

School monitor mother’s instruction of the children is sufficient. Section 48222 provides an exemption from compulsory public school education for
“[c]hildren who are being instructed in a private full-time day school.” (Italics added.) It is the language of the statutes that constitutes
California’s plan for education of its children. Thus, under California’s compulsory public school education law, Mr. Neven’s occasional observation
of mother’s instruction of the children and their occasional taking of tests at the private school is without legal significance. Lastly, we address
the parents’ claim that they home school their children because of religious beliefs. We recognize that “a State’s interest in universal education .
. . is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights and interests, such as those specifically protected by the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children so
long as they . . . ‘prepare [them] for additional obligations.’ ” (Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) 406 U.S. 205, 214 [32 L.Ed.2d 15, 92 S.Ct. 1526]
(Yoder).) The parents cite Yoder as a basis for their contention that their religious beliefs entitle them to refuse to send their children to
school. Yoder involved children whose parents’ religion (Amish) accepted education given outside of the home for grades one through eight but
mandated that children not continue their education in a public or private school past the eighth grade. The Yoder court rejected the notion that
parents have a universal right to refuse to obey a state’s compulsory education law. The court recognized that “allowing every person to make his own
standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important

16

interests” is precluded by “the very concept of ordered liberty,” and thus, “if the Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective
evaluation and rejection of the contemporary secular values accepted by the majority, . . . their claims would not rest on a religious basis” but
rather would be philosophical and personal. (Yoder, supra, 406 U.S. at pp. 215-216.) However, from the testimonial evidence of scholars on the
subjects of religion and education, the court found that the Amish traditional way of life does not rest on personal preferences but rather on “deep
religious conviction, shared by an organized group, and intimately related to daily living” (id. at p. 216), and the Amish religious beliefs and
style of living are centuries old (id. at p. 217). “Old Order Amish communities today are characterized by a fundamental belief that salvation
requires life in a church community separate and apart from the world and worldly influence. This concept of life aloof from the world and its values
is central to their faith.” (Id. at p. 210.) Testimony showed that not only were the values taught in high schools contrary to those of the Amish
religion, but attendance at high school takes Amish children away from their community during the period of their lives when they are to acquire
Amish attitudes and integrate into the Amish religious community. The Yoder court observed that Amish children receive an informal vocational
education in their own communities after graduation from eighth grade that prepares them to be productive members of the Amish community. (Id. at pp.
211-212, 222.) Moreover, one of the witnesses testified that compulsory high school education for Amish children would “ultimately result in the
destruction of the Old Order Amish church community as it exists in the United States today.” (Id. at p. 212.)

17

The parents in the instant case have asserted in a declaration that it is because of their “sincerely held religious beliefs” that they home school
their children and those religious beliefs “are based on Biblical teachings and principles.” Even if the parents’ declaration had been signed under
penalty of perjury, which it was not, those assertions are not the quality of evidence that permits us to say that application of California’s
compulsory public school education law to them violates their First Amendment rights. Their statements are conclusional, not factually specific.
Moreover, such sparse representations are too easily asserted by any parent who wishes to home school his or her child.

4. Remand for Further Proceedings

Because the trial court in this case simply ruled that the parents have a constitutional right to home school their children, the court made no
explicit factual findings concerning the parents’ compliance with California’s compulsory public education law. So that findings and legal
conclusions can be made on the record by the trial court, we will remand the case for a hearing on the issue whether the parents have been in
compliance with that law.

The dependency court should exercise the authority, granted to it by Welfare and Institutions Code sections 361, subdivision (a), and 362,
subdivision (d), to order the parents to comply with the Education Code. Upon remand, absent any legal ground for not doing so, the court must order
the parents to (1) enroll their children in a public full-time day school, or a legally qualified private full-time day school and (2) see to it that
the children receive their education in such school. Given the history of this family, 18

which we need not discuss here,7 permitting the parents to educate the children at home by means of a credentialed tutor would likely pose too many
difficulties for the tutor. Further, the court should not permit the children to be enrolled in the Sunland Christian School because that school was
willing to participate in the deprivation of the children’s right to a legal education.

DISPOSITION

The petition for extraordinary writ is granted. Let a writ of mandate issue directing the respondent juvenile court to comply with the views
expressed herein.

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION
CROSKEY, J.
WE CONCUR:
KLEIN, P. J.
KITCHING, J.

7 On November 20, 2007, we filed a separate, unpublished opinion for this case that decides consolidated appeals (Nos. B192601 and B195484) filed by
the parents and two of the minor children. Those appeals address matters other than the home schooling issue and our opinion sets out a history of
the family vis-à-vis the dependency court.

What is Amazon Mechanical Turk?

In 1769, Hungarian nobleman Wolfgang von Kempelen astonished Europe by building a mechanical chess-playing automaton that defeated nearly every opponent it faced. A life-sized wooden mannequin, adorned with a fur-trimmed robe and a turban, Kempelen’s “Turk” was seated behind a cabinet and toured Europe confounding such brilliant challengers as Benjamin Franklin and Napoleon Bonaparte. To persuade skeptical audiences, Kempelen would slide open the cabinet’s doors to reveal the intricate set of gears, cogs and springs that powered his invention. He convinced them that he had built a machine that made decisions using artificial intelligence. What they did not know was the secret behind the Mechanical Turk: a human chess master cleverly concealed inside.

Today, we build complex software applications based on the things computers do well, such as storing and retrieving large amounts of information or rapidly performing calculations. However, humans still significantly outperform the most powerful computers at completing such simple tasks as identifying objects in photographs—something children can do even before they learn to speak.

When we think of interfaces between human beings and computers, we usually assume that the human being is the one requesting that a task be completed, and the computer is completing the task and providing the results. What if this process were reversed and a computer program could ask a human being to perform a task and return the results? What if it could coordinate many human beings to perform a task?

Amazon Mechanical Turk provides a web services API for computers to integrate “artificial artificial intelligence” directly into their processing by making requests of humans. Developers use the Amazon Mechanical Turk web service to submit tasks to the Amazon Mechanical Turk web site, approve completed tasks, and incorporate the answers into their software applications. To the application, the transaction looks very much like any remote procedure call: the application sends the request, and the service returns the results. Behind the scenes, a network of humans fuels this artificial artificial intelligence by coming to the web site, searching for and completing tasks, and receiving payment for their work.

I have found the Mechanical Turk service useful for some tasks I needed done but for which I did not have the skills, time or patience.

The first thing I tried was creating a task to translate a short newspaper article from French into English. However, this did not work out very well as I got two submissions that were obviously the product of machine translation from something like AltaVista Babel Fish or Google Translate. The third submission was just barely acceptable but ultimately not usable for my purposes. To make matters worse, since I don’t know much French I couldn’t easily verify the accuracy of the translation. However, Mechanical Turk could certainly be used for translation services (indeed there are a couple companies that have used it for that purpose - however, when I contacted one of them for a quote I never got any reply) if you set up a system to evaluate the quality and accuracy of the translation work.

I had much better success with another type of task: transcribing videos in a foreign language (in this case, French television news reports). I think it helped that I offered a bit more money than most requesters were offering for similar tasks. However, I still paid much less than a professional transcription service would have charged.
More on this later…

In a September 4, 2000, story in Forbes magazine, Brigid McMenamin reported on their case:

Los Angeles accountant Michael Sklar was shelling out $24,000 a year to send his four children to Jewish day schools in 1994 when a four-line Internal Revenue Service ruling caught his eye.

The November 1993 edict declared “obsoleted” the IRS’ 1978 ruling barring members of the Church of Scientology from deducting the “fixed donations” they paid for religious education and “auditing”–a practice in which Scientology ministers ask members probing questions to identify areas in need of spiritual work.

Sklar wondered: If Scientologists can deduct their form of religious education, why can’t I deduct mine? The Orthodox Jew decided to write off 55% of his tuition bills, based on the proportion of time his children’s schools said was spent on religious courses.

The Sklars claimed the deduction on their 1994 tax return and amended their earlier returns to take the deduction. In correspondence included with their return, they stated that they believed that their Orthodox Jewish family was entitled to the same tax breaks granted to Scientologist families. The IRS apparently misunderstood their claim and informed them that, to take the religious education deduction, they would need to submit documentation proving they were members of the Church of Scientology. When they replied that they were Orthodox Jews and not Scientologists, the IRS denied their deduction. Thus began a legal battle that would continue for many years. Eventually, the Sklars were fortunate enough to get pro bono legal counsel from Jeffrey Zuckerman of Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle. After a number of unfavorable rulings, including one in the 9th Circuit appeals court in 2004, the case came back to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in 2006 and finally came to be heard on February 4, 2008.

In a recent article, Josh Gerstein of the New York Sun reported on the hearing:

A Jewish couple’s bid to take a tax deduction they say the Internal Revenue Service reserves only for members of the Church of Scientology is getting a friendly reception from a federal appeals court, increasing the possibility of a ruling that could create a tax break for taxpayers of many religions who pay tuition to religious schools.

During arguments on the case this week, three judges who ride the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals expressed deep skepticism of the IRS’s position that the way the agency treats Scientologists is irrelevant to the deductions the Orthodox Jews, Michael and Marla Sklar, took for part of their children’s day school tuition and for after-school classes in Jewish law.

“The view of the IRS is it can unconstitutionally violate the Constitution by establishing religion, by treating one religion more favorably than other religions in terms of what is allowed as deductions, and there can never be any judicial review of that?” Judge Kim Wardlaw asked at the court session Monday in Pasadena, Calif.

“That is not at all what I said,” a Justice Department lawyer representing the IRS, Ellen Delsole, said.

“That’s the bottom line,” Judge Wardlaw and a colleague on the panel, Harry Pregerson, both replied. “This does intrude into the Establishment Clause,” Judge Wardlaw added.

Fortunately for those who weren’t able to make it to Pasadena last week, an audio recording of the entire 48-minute hearing is available.

While it is clear to me that that the IRS shouldn’t favor one religion over another by granting its members special tax breaks that are denied to everyone else, the ideal solution in this case would not be expanding the tax deduction to include adherents of all religions but rather to get rid of it entirely. I would go even further and suggest that we should completely eliminate all religious tax breaks. They are part of a perverse and antiquated system that needs to be abolished. I am a member of a Church that is perhaps the only religion in the world that is proud to pay its taxes. It is time for other religions to do the same.

Update (March 2, 2008): While the 9th Circuit has yet to issue a ruling in this case, there is an excellent interview with Jeffrey I. Zuckerman, the attorney representing the Sklars, on GlossLip radio.

More information:

• Audio of February 4, 2008 oral argument in Sklar, et al v. CIR (Windows Media Audio (WMA), 0:47:48, 7.07MB)
• US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - Docket # 06-72961 (PDF, 3 pages, 60KB)
• New York Sun: Judges Press IRS on Church Tax Break — 2008-02-08
• New York Sun: A School Case To Watch — 2008-02-08
• Google News Archive Search - Timeline - Sklar, Scientology, deduction
• New York Times: Scientologists’ Tax Break Cited in Suit Against I.R.S. - 2004-03-24
• 125 T.C. No. 14 UNITED STATES TAX COURT MICHAEL AND MARLA SKLAR, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent Docket No. 395-01. Filed December 21, 2005.
• T.C. Memo. 2000-118 UNITED STATES TAX COURT - MICHAEL AND MARLA SKLAR, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent - Docket No. 1556-97. Filed April 5, 2000.
• Jewish Telegraphic Agency: One Family Goes To Tax Court To Fight For Tax Breaks For Religious Education — 2004-03-31
• Jewish Law - Legal Briefs - Michael and Marla Sklar v. Commisioner of Internal Revenue
• United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit - 00-70753 - Amended Opinion - February 27, 2002 (PDF, 23 pages, 45KB)

“Mr. Lorello noted in his confession that most of what he stole was not particularly valuable (some of his items sold for as little as $10). Most of the artifacts were known among dealers as trash, he wrote, although he used a trashier word than trash.”

Please don’t keep us in suspense, Eric. What word did he use? The only ones I can think of at the moment are synonymous with excrement but surely that is only because I have a limited imagination.

Back in the summer of 1999, my genius and multi-talented brother Daniel Frouman and his band Psy-Fly jammed at The Mercury with some friends of theirs. The event was filmed for posterity. I recently dug it up out of the vast frouman.com archives.

Here are the video credits:

Shot by Aaron Land
Produced and Edited by Frederico Geib
Stock footage provided by Arrowhead Film & Video
Austin, Texas, 03/2000

So I called the number listed and after going through the extremely annoying voice prompt phone tree and waiting on hold for a few minutes, I was informed that I should call the “dry loop” number which is 1-800-264-0002. This time I waited much longer on hold (about 15 minutes). Finally, I got to talk to a real live person. She asked for some information to look up my account so she could check to see if I could get it or not. So about a minute goes by and she informs me that it is available and starts to explain the order process. But then she notices that her system now says I can’t get it which she says is very strange. She says she’ll try something else and after a few minutes says it is available and she is putting the order through now. But then she says it was rejected. So it seems I can’t get it after all. This makes no sense as there is certainly no technical reason why they can’t provide me with the service I already have without charging me for another service which I don’t want or need.

A couple of years ago, Michael T. Arnold landed at the Los Angeles International Airport after a 20-hour flight from the Philippines. He had his laptop with him, and a customs officer took a look at what was on his hard drive. Clicking on folders called “Kodak pictures” and “Kodak memories,” the officer found child pornography.

The search was not unusual: the government contends that it is perfectly free to inspect every laptop that enters the country, whether or not there is anything suspicious about the computer or its owner. Rummaging through a computer’s hard drive, the government says, is no different than looking through a suitcase.

One federal appeals court has agreed, and a second seems ready to follow suit.

There is one lonely voice on the other side. In 2006, Judge Dean D. Pregerson of Federal District Court in Los Angeles suppressed the evidence against Mr. Arnold.

“Electronic storage devices function as an extension of our own memory,” Judge Pregerson wrote, in explaining why the government should not be allowed to inspect them without cause. “They are capable of storing our thoughts, ranging from the most whimsical to the most profound.”

Computer hard drives can include, Judge Pregerson continued, diaries, letters, medical information, financial records, trade secrets, attorney-client materials and — the clincher, of course — information about reporters’ “confidential sources and story leads.”

But Judge Pregerson’s decision seems to be headed for reversal. The three judges who heard the arguments in October in the appeal of his decision seemed persuaded that a computer is just a container and deserves no special protection from searches at the border. The same information in hard-copy form, their questions suggested, would doubtless be subject to search.

This is certainly an interesting case. Those who know me are well aware that my contempt for child molesters and consumers of child pornography is boundless. Indeed, while I strongly oppose the use of torture in interrogations (not only because I believe it is morally wrong but also because it is ineffective), I would make an exception to allow child molesters and abusers to be tortured over a long period of time as a form of retributive justice. However, I am also a strong supporter of the constitutional right of individuals in the United States to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. Thus, I don’t believe that government agents at the border or anywhere else should have a nearly unlimited power to search through persons and their belongings without reasonable suspicion, probable cause or a search warrant. I do think the border is a special case and different rules should apply but there should still be limits on the power to search. Unless there is reasonable suspicion or probable cause, the scope of searches at the border should be limited to the primary mission of U.S. Customs and Border Protection: preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the United States, stemming the flow of illegal drugs and other contraband and protecting the United States agricultural and economic interests from harmful pests and diseases. They should not have the unchecked power to look at every file on a traveler’s laptop or read every document in a traveler’s possession. Nevertheless, under current case law they do have that power. The “Border search exception” article on Wikipedia has some good information on that subject. I listened to the audio of the oral argument before the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Arnold and, while I haven’t read all the briefs in the case, I have to say that the government’s position and argument struck me as being very strong and compelling while the appellee’s argument was weak and not very persuasive.

More about this later…

Vandari.com Offers Apostates Google Email and Collaboration Solutions Austin, Texas., January 2, 2008 - Vandari.com announced today plans to deploy Google Apps™ - Google’s set of hosted and customizable communications solutions as part of the group’s core IT service offerings. As a result apostates will have access to free communications tools including email, shared calendars, instant messaging and word processing under the vandari.com, vandari.net and vandari.org domain names.”Google Apps will help us destroy The Family International more easily and efficiently than ever before, while relieving our IT department of the traditional costs associated with email and collaboration solutions” said Jacob Sanders.” “We’re glad to let Google do what it does best — provide us with great technology, so we can do what we do best — serve our demon overlords.”

Google Apps allows institutions as well as individuals to use Google’s communication and collaboration applications under their own domain names. All services are hosted by Google and are available to users via any internet-connected computer and many mobile devices.

Google Apps includes the following services:

• Gmail™ - provides gigabytes of email storage, highly effective spam filtering and powerful search;

• Google Calendar™ - allows easy coordination of work or class schedules, meetings and events online;

• Google Talk™ - supports free PC-to-PC voice calls and instant messaging;

• Google Docs™ - allows users to create and collaborate on documents and spreadsheets in real-time;

For More Information:

Jacob Sanders

jacob@vandari.com

How to get a Vandari.com Google Apps account:

Send an email to jacob@vandari.com with your name (for example - “Jane Doe” You must provide a name but it doesn’t have to be your real name.) and the username you want (for example, jane@vandari.com). If your request is approved (and it very likely will be), you will receive an email with instructions and a temporary password you must change after your first login.

The Senate sponsor, Frank Lautenberg, D-N.J., expressed strong support for the provision Friday, saying it would help U.S. plaintiffs in lawsuits against Iran and Libya, including relatives of Americans killed in the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983 and in the bombing of a Berlin disco in 1986.

“My language allows American victims of terror to hold perpetrators accountable - plain and simple,” Lautenberg said in a statement.

Naturally, one would assume that this would be something the Bush administration would strongly support. Yet, it seems it would like a special exception for terrorism sponsoring states in which a regime change occurs.

That makes no sense. When our civil justice system holds a company or a nation-state liable for something, that liability is tied to the company or the state in question and not its leadership (although separate claims can certainly be brought against the individuals responsible). While leadership changes may be highly desirable in many of these cases, there is no reason that there should be an enormous loophole permitting a state sponsor of terrorism to escape all liability simply because there is a change of control in its government.

Unlike the Bush administration, I believe that terrorists and those who support them should be held accountable for their actions and thus I fully support section 1083 of H.R. 1585. Nevertheless, I understand that there may be reasonable objections to this section and rational reasons that could be offered for why this section should not become law. However, the feeble argument of the Bush administration does not even come close to offering a rational basis for its opposition. The White House position, that these legal claims should not proceed simply because they involve acts that occurred prior to the 2003 regime change in Iraq, is not persuasive.

Here is the section in question:

SEC. 1083. TERRORISM EXCEPTION TO IMMUNITY.

(a) Terrorism Exception to Immunity-

(1) IN GENERAL- Chapter 97 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by inserting after section 1605 the following:

`Sec. 1605A. Terrorism exception to the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign state

`(a) In General-

`(1) NO IMMUNITY- A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case not otherwise covered by this chapter in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources for such an act if such act or provision of material support or resources is engaged in by an official, employee, or agent of such foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency.

`(2) CLAIM HEARD- The court shall hear a claim under this section if–

`(A)(i)(I) the foreign state was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism at the time the act described in paragraph (1) occurred, or was so designated as a result of such act, and, subject to subclause (II), either remains so designated when the claim is filed under this section or was so designated within the 6-month period before the claim is filed under this section; or

`(II) in the case of an action that is refiled under this section by reason of section 1083(c)(2)(A) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 or is filed under this section by reason of section 1083(c)(3) of that Act, the foreign state was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism when the original action or the related action under section 1605(a)(7) (as in effect before the enactment of this section) or section 589 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997 (as contained in section 101(c) of division A of Public Law 104-208) was filed;

`(ii) the claimant or the victim was, at the time the act described in paragraph (1) occurred–

`(I) a national of the United States;

`(II) a member of the armed forces; or

`(III) otherwise an employee of the Government of the United States, or of an individual performing a contract awarded by the United States Government, acting within the scope of the employee’s employment; and

`(iii) in a case in which the act occurred in the foreign state against which the claim has been brought, the claimant has afforded the foreign state a reasonable opportunity to arbitrate the claim in accordance with the accepted international rules of arbitration; or

`(B) the act described in paragraph (1) is related to Case Number 1:00CV03110 (EGS) in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.

`(b) Limitations- An action may be brought or maintained under this section if the action is commenced, or a related action was commenced under section 1605(a)(7) (before the date of the enactment of this section) or section 589 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997 (as contained in section 101(c) of division A of Public Law 104-208) not later than the latter of–

`(1) 10 years after April 24, 1996; or

`(2) 10 years after the date on which the cause of action arose.

`(c) Private Right of Action- A foreign state that is or was a state sponsor of terrorism as described in subsection (a)(2)(A)(i), and any official, employee, or agent of that foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency, shall be liable to–

`(1) a national of the United States,

`(2) a member of the armed forces,

`(3) an employee of the Government of the United States, or of an individual performing a contract awarded by the United States Government, acting within the scope of the employee’s employment, or

`(4) the legal representative of a person described in paragraph (1), (2), or (3),

for personal injury or death caused by acts described in subsection (a)(1) of that foreign state, or of an official, employee, or agent of that foreign state, for which the courts of the United States may maintain jurisdiction under this section for money damages. In any such action, damages may include economic damages, solatium, pain and suffering, and punitive damages. In any such action, a foreign state shall be vicariously liable for the acts of its officials, employees, or agents.

`(d) Additional Damages- After an action has been brought under subsection (c), actions may also be brought for reasonably foreseeable property loss, whether insured or uninsured, third party liability, and loss claims under life and property insurance policies, by reason of the same acts on which the action under subsection (c) is based.

`(e) Special Masters-

`(1) IN GENERAL- The courts of the United States may appoint special masters to hear damage claims brought under this section.

`(2) TRANSFER OF FUNDS- The Attorney General shall transfer, from funds available for the program under section 1404C of the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (42 U.S.C. 10603c), to the Administrator of the United States district court in which any case is pending which has been brought or maintained under this section such funds as may be required to cover the costs of special masters appointed under paragraph (1). Any amount paid in compensation to any such special master shall constitute an item of court costs.

`(f) Appeal- In an action brought under this section, appeals from orders not conclusively ending the litigation may only be taken pursuant to section 1292(b) of this title.

`(g) Property Disposition-

`(1) IN GENERAL- In every action filed in a United States district court in which jurisdiction is alleged under this section, the filing of a notice of pending action pursuant to this section, to which is attached a copy of the complaint filed in the action, shall have the effect of establishing a lien of lis pendens upon any real property or tangible personal property that is–

`(A) subject to attachment in aid of execution, or execution, under section 1610;

`(B) located within that judicial district; and

`(C) titled in the name of any defendant, or titled in the name of any entity controlled by any defendant if such notice contains a statement listing such controlled entity.

`(2) NOTICE- A notice of pending action pursuant to this section shall be filed by the clerk of the district court in the same manner as any pending action and shall be indexed by listing as defendants all named defendants and all entities listed as controlled by any defendant.

`(3) ENFORCEABILITY- Liens established by reason of this subsection shall be enforceable as provided in chapter 111 of this title.

`(h) Definitions- For purposes of this section–

`(1) the term `aircraft sabotage’ has the meaning given that term in Article 1 of the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation;

`(2) the term `hostage taking’ has the meaning given that term in Article 1 of the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages;

`(3) the term `material support or resources’ has the meaning given that term in section 2339A of title 18;

`(4) the term `armed forces’ has the meaning given that term in section 101 of title 10;

`(5) the term `national of the United States’ has the meaning given that term in section 101(a)(22) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(22));

`(6) the term `state sponsor of terrorism’ means a country the government of which the Secretary of State has determined, for purposes of section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2405(j)), section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371), section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780), or any other provision of law, is a government that has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism; and

`(7) the terms `torture’ and `extrajudicial killing’ have the meaning given those terms in section 3 of the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 (28 U.S.C. 1350 note).’.

(2) AMENDMENT TO CHAPTER ANALYSIS- The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 97 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by inserting after the item relating to section 1605 the following:

`1605A. Terrorism exception to the jurisdictional immunity of a foreign state.’.

(b) Conforming Amendments-

(1) GENERAL EXCEPTION- Section 1605 of title 28, United States Code, is amended–

(A) in subsection (a)–

(i) in paragraph (5)(B), by inserting `or’ after the semicolon;

(ii) in paragraph (6)(D), by striking `; or’ and inserting a period; and

(iii) by striking paragraph (7);

(B) by repealing subsections (e) and (f); and

(C) in subsection (g)(1)(A), by striking `but for subsection (a)(7)’ and inserting `but for section 1605A’.

(2) COUNTERCLAIMS- Section 1607(a) of title 28, United States Code, is amended by inserting `or 1605A’ after `1605′.

(3) PROPERTY- Section 1610 of title 28, United States Code, is amended–

(A) in subsection (a)(7), by striking `1605(a)(7)’ and inserting `1605A’;

(B) in subsection (b)(2), by striking `(5), or (7), or 1605(b)’ and inserting `or (5), 1605(b), or 1605A’;

(C) in subsection (f), in paragraphs (1)(A) and (2)(A), by inserting `(as in effect before the enactment of section 1605A) or section 1605A’ after `1605(a)(7)’; and

(D) by adding at the end the following:

`(g) Property in Certain Actions-

`(1) IN GENERAL- Subject to paragraph (3), the property of a foreign state against which a judgment is entered under section 1605A, and the property of an agency or instrumentality of such a state, including property that is a separate juridical entity or is an interest held directly or indirectly in a separate juridical entity, is subject to attachment in aid of execution, and execution, upon that judgment as provided in this section, regardless of–

`(A) the level of economic control over the property by the government of the foreign state;

`(B) whether the profits of the property go to that government;

`(C) the degree to which officials of that government manage the property or otherwise control its daily affairs;

`(D) whether that government is the sole beneficiary in interest of the property; or

`(E) whether establishing the property as a separate entity would entitle the foreign state to benefits in United States courts while avoiding its obligations.

`(2) UNITED STATES SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY INAPPLICABLE- Any property of a foreign state, or agency or instrumentality of a foreign state, to which paragraph (1) applies shall not be immune from attachment in aid of execution, or execution, upon a judgment entered under section 1605A because the property is regulated by the United States Government by reason of action taken against that foreign state under the Trading With the Enemy Act or the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.

`(3) THIRD-PARTY JOINT PROPERTY HOLDERS- Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to supersede the authority of a court to prevent appropriately the impairment of an interest held by a person who is not liable in the action giving rise to a judgment in property subject to attachment in aid of execution, or execution, upon such judgment.’.

(4) VICTIMS OF CRIME ACT- Section 1404C(a)(3) of the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (42 U.S.C. 10603c(a)(3)) is amended by striking `December 21, 1988 with respect to which an investigation or’ and inserting `October 23, 1983, with respect to which an investigation or civil or criminal’.

(c) Application to Pending Cases-

(1) IN GENERAL- The amendments made by this section shall apply to any claim arising under section 1605A of title 28, United States Code.

(2) PRIOR ACTIONS-

(A) IN GENERAL- With respect to any action that–

(i) was brought under section 1605(a)(7) of title 28, United States Code, or section 589 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997 (as contained in section 101(c) of division A of Public Law 104-208), before the date of the enactment of this Act,

(ii) relied upon either such provision as creating a cause of action,

(iii) has been adversely affected on the grounds that either or both of these provisions fail to create a cause of action against the state, and

(iv) as of such date of enactment, is before the courts in any form, including on appeal or motion under rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,

that action, and any judgment in the action shall, on motion made by plaintiffs to the United States district court where the action was initially brought, or judgment in the action was initially entered, be given effect as if the action had originally been filed under section 1605A(c) of title 28, United States Code.

(B) DEFENSES WAIVED- The defenses of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and limitation period are waived–

(i) in any action with respect to which a motion is made under subparagraph (A), or

(ii) in any action that was originally brought, before the date of the enactment of this Act, under section 1605(a)(7) of title 28, United States Code, or section 589 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997 (as contained in section 101(c) of division A of Public Law 104-208), and is refiled under section 1605A(c) of title 28, United States Code,

to the extent such defenses are based on the claim in the action.

(C) TIME LIMITATIONS- A motion may be made or an action may be refiled under subparagraph (A) only–

(i) if the original action was commenced not later than the latter of–

(I) 10 years after April 24, 1996; or

(II) 10 years after the cause of action arose; and

(ii) within the 60-day period beginning on the date of the enactment of this Act.

(3) RELATED ACTIONS- If an action arising out of an act or incident has been timely commenced under section 1605(a)(7) of title 28, United States Code, or section 589 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1997 (as contained in section 101(c) of division A of Public Law 104-208), any other action arising out of the same act or incident may be brought under section 1605A of title 28, United States Code, if the action is commenced not later than the latter of 60 days after–

(A) the date of the entry of judgment in the original action; or

(B) the date of the enactment of this Act.

(4) PRESERVING THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS- Nothing in section 1503 of the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003 (Public Law 108-11, 117 Stat. 579) has ever authorized, directly or indirectly, the making inapplicable of any provision of chapter 97 of title 28, United States Code, or the removal of the jurisdiction of any court of the United States.

(d) Severability- If any provision of this section or the amendments made by this section, or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of this section and such amendments, and the application of such provision to other persons not similarly situated or to other circumstances, shall not be affected by such invalidation.

SCOX was finally delisted from NASDAQ yesterday (December 27th, 2007). SCOX.PK closed today at $0.065 with a market cap of about 1.17 million. It is indeed gratifying to see the market finally recognize what most intelligent observers have known for the past 4 years: that SCO’s fraudulent and feckless schemes were doomed to failure. But it is disturbing that it has gone on so long and drained an enormous amount of money that could have been put to much better uses. By my rough calculations, the parties to the various cases SCO is involved in have spent a combined total of well over $100 million in legal fees and expenses not to mention that some investors have lost tens of millions of dollars. After SCO is utterly destroyed (and sadly this will probably take a couple more years during which even more money will be wasted), I doubt any of the victims of SCO’s fraudulent scheme will be able to recover much more than a tiny fraction of their losses.

Some may find this interesting.

More Information:

• CBS THREATENS EERIE & ECC: “STOP SAMPLING OR WE SUE!”
• ECC: Culture Jamming

The Last.fm service is also amazing and I wish I had tried it a long time ago. One of its best features is that it helps you find music you might never have heard of otherwise. I’ve always enjoyed listening to Bessie Smith. I first heard of her when I lived in Chattanooga for a few years and attended the Bessie Smith Blues Strut during the Riverbend festival a couple times but I didn’t become a real fan until the professor for an American literature course I was taking brought a record player to class one day, dimmed the lights, played Bessie Smith singing “St. Louis Blues” and then challenged us to identify the singer. No one could although one person guessed it was Ella Fitzgerald. He knew I had lived in Chattanooga for awhile and seemed disappointed that I didn’t know the answer. There’s a lot of things I’ve forgotten from the years I wasted spent in college but listening to Bessie Smith that day is something I never forgot. Thus, it may not be surprising that one of the first artists I looked for on Last.fm was Bessie Smith. Under “Similar Artists” I soon found Victoria Spivey and I was hooked after the first couple songs.